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Abstract: Good institutions were pivotal to the emergence of
capitalism and hence the creation of wealth, prosperity and
development in the world. In this paper, the authors argue that
one of the reasons for the poverty and underdevelopment in sub-
Saharan Africa is the weak institutional framework which exists in
these countries. The laws, rules and regulations governing
businesses and entrepreneurial activities are either too weak or
ineffective, and could be riding roughshod over any political interest
or individual. The paper presents evidence from the literature to
amplify the view that strong and effective institutions are
fundamental to reinvigorating economic growth and development.
Finally, the authors suggest that a complete overhaul and
rejuvenation of the institutional framework which exists in the
countries of sub-Saharan Africa is crucial to the creation of jobs,
and the alleviation of poverty and underdevelopment.
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Introduction
In 1759, the authoritative French intellectual, Voltaire, wrote one
of his classic novels, the Candide or Optimism. This story revolved
around the young and impressionable Candide as he left home to
experience life outside his family, as he had been taught by his
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teacher and Professor, Pangloss, to experience the best of all
possible worlds. However, what Candide experienced in reality
was the murderous and treacherous world of poverty, disease,
pirates, persecution, lies and betrayal (Pangloss cited in Reinert,
2008:8). He experienced a world in which his fiancée, the beautiful
Cungonde, was knifed, beaten up, gang-raped and sold into slavery.
While all this happened, Professor Pangloss continued to preach
that this was the best of all worlds, and Candide broke down in
exasperation and despair and asked if this was the best of all
possible worlds, and if so, what must the others be like? (Pangloss
cited in Reinert, 2008:8).
The story about Candide narrated in the above paragraph is meant
to illustrate that our lives cannot rely only on the vagaries of weather
and fate alone. Human beings and societies must make conscious
efforts to improve their living conditions or else the status quo
would remain ad infinitum. In economic and politic terms, it means
it is time that Africans stop accepting the orthodoxy common to
its leaders that the problems on the continent were caused by
outsiders from Europe and North America (Ukwandu, 2014: 46).
This is not an attempt to postulate that slavery, colonialism and
neo-colonialism had no role in the poverty and underdevelopment
of the continent. The reality is that Africans have to insist on good
governance and hold African leaders accountable for the
mismanagement of national resources and poverty in their countries.
The author argues that corrupt and inefficient states and their
insipid institutions are contributory factors to poverty and
underdevelopment on the continent (Ukwandu, 2014).
The conundrum of how and why some societies develop and some
do not, and what the essential ingredients for the development of
states and societies are, have been the concerns of many
intellectuals (de Tocqueville, Tonnies, Weber, Schumpeter, Comte
and Adam Smith, List, Spencer, Maine, Marx, Durkheim and
Keynes). The conditions that facilitate or hamper human
development have long been an area of interest for these scholars.
A careful appraisal of their views will help us understand that the
internal conditions of a state, through which it exercises its control
and dominance over its citizens, which Mkandawire (1999) called
‘institutions’, is an indispensable piece of the development puzzle.\
The German economist List (1885:174-5) advised that states should
play a critical role in solving the problems of poverty and
underdevelopment in their countries, and that these responsibilities
should not be abdicated to foreign powers or the market. His advice
was heeded by his native Germany and many European and even
Asian powers at the time. According to him:
“Between each individual and entire humanity… stands the nation,
with its special language and literature, with its own peculiar origin
and history, with its special manners and customs, laws and
institutions, with the claims of all these for existence, independence,
perfection and continuance for the future, and with its separate
territories. It is the task of the national economy to accomplish the
economic development of the nation and to prepare it for admission
into the universal society of the future” (List, 1885:174-5).
Some political and economic leaders in Africa are preoccupied with
placing the blame for the economic failures of the continent on
the evils of colonialism and globalisation, while no attention is
paid to the structural deficiencies and weak institutional framework
that has impeded development on the continent. According to
Reinert (2008:8), Voltaire used the message of Pangloss to attack
the deterministic and hands-off policy that blamed outside forces
such as faith, God, deities, markets and nature for poverty and
underdevelopment in the world, without looking at how internal
forces contributed to the miasma. The central message of Voltaire
is very applicable to Africa today, as the problem of poverty and
underdevelopment on the continent is blamed squarely on outside
forces such as colonialism and globalisation, without questioning
the effect of weak institutions which hinders development on the
continent (Reinert, 2008:8). The sooner African policy- makers
and citizens confront the spectre of mismanagement and poor
governance in Africa and eradicate poverty, the better for Africans.
Africa’s poverty and underdevelopment therefore lies in its poor
governance. In other words, the failure of development in most of
post-colonial Africa is a direct consequence of the poor policies,
programmes and governance that have characterised government
decisions in Africa (Ukwandu, 2014). Human societies are
characterised by a plethora of interests, values and ideas that are
jostling to determine and shape the sharing and distribution of
resources in any given area (Ukwandu, 2014). African countries
have not been able to develop states that are able to effectively
distribute scarce resources and also prevent the minority elite from
exploiting and manipulating the national interests for their own
purposes.
Leftwich (1983) defined politics as all the activities of conflict,
cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and
distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, at local, national
or international level, or in the private or public domain. Implicit in
144 145
the idea of Leftwich (1983) is the fact that because the politics of
governments in most of Africa has been prebendal, patrimonial,
autocratic, authoritarian and atavistic, it has not been able to
properly initiate and implement genuine development efforts and
reduce poverty. This has resulted in weak institutions in most
aspects of national life, and that is a major cause of the poverty
and underdevelopment on the continent (Leftwich, 1983).
The role of good and effective institutions in development has
long been a permanent feature of development discourse. In 1613,
Antonio Serra, in his Brief Treatise (cited in Reinert, 2008), was
concerned about why his city of Naples was poor, despite its
abundant natural resources, and the city of Venice, which was
located and built on a swamp, was rich and prosperous. In his
research, Serra found that Venetians, without the rich agricultural
land of the Neapolitans, had simplified their way of doing business
and the regulations which were implemented, and as a result of
the simple and transparent laws of the rulers of the city, it attracted
all sorts of skills; and manufacturing and other types of activities
flourished in the city (Reinert, 2008:8).
Simply put, good institutions helped to improve governance in
Venice which in turn created the conditions necessary for economic
activities and prosperity to flourish. This is in contrast to the rulers
of Naples who believed that their abundant natural resources would
automatically lead to growth and development (Reinert, 2008:8).
The relevance of Serra’s treatise can be found in the condition of
many countries in Africa which, although rich in natural resources
remain steeped in poverty and poor living conditions, while countries
like Singapore built on a swamp with little natural resources, have
flourished and developed (Reinert, 2008:8). Good institutions
remain the key ingredient in the transformation of any country,
and Africa has neglected this to its own detriment. Before we
consider the relationship between good institutions and economic
growth and development, it is necessary to clarify some key
concepts used in the article; like institutions and development
(North, 1990; 1995; North & Weingast, 1989).
Conceptual clarification on Institutions
Capitalism and its benefits enjoyed by many parts of the world
were effected through good institutions.  The interactions that
underpinned capitalism were grounded in the mutual exchange of
goods and services in a free market economy (Orkasson, Obed &
Svensoon, 2009).  For the majority of people within a society to
reap the benefits of capitalism and development, good institutions
must and should create an enabling environment in which the
transaction costs of exchanging goods and services or producing
services are minimised (North, 1995). Under good institutions,
entrepreneurial activities, both private and public, can be profitable
and organised (North, 1990).
It must be emphasised that certainty concerning government policy
contributes to growth and development (North, 1990). It is within
this paradigm that the authors argue that the institutions that
characterise most business transactions in Africa, both private
and public, serve as a disincentive to promoting economic growth
and development on a scale that can reduce poverty in Africa.
This school of thought also believes that the institutional framework
undergirding economic activities in Africa needs a major overhaul
or reform. In outlining the salient role of institutions in stimulating
the growth and development of countries, it is important to consider
the views of North (1990:65), who stated the following:
“We have only to contrast the organisation of production in a Third
World economy with that of an advanced industrial economy to be
impressed by the consequences of poorly defined and ineffective
property rights. Not only will the institutional framework result in
high costs of transacting in the former, but also insecure property
rights will result in using technologies that employ little capital and
do not entail long-term agreements... Moreover, such mundane
problems as the inability to get spare parts or a two year wait to
get a telephone installed will necessitate a different organisation
of production that an advanced country requires. A bribe sufficient
to get quick delivery through the maze of import controls or get
rapid telephone installation may exist, but the resultant shadow
transactions costs significantly alter relative prices and consequently
the technology employed”(North 1990:65).
To further clarify the meaning, North (1990:80) defined ‘institutions
as the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’.To
provide clarity on what good institution entails, Rawls (1971)
provided this view:
“By a good institution I shall understand a public system of rules
which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties,
powers and immunities and the like. These rules specify certain
forms of actions as permissible, others as forbidden…. An institution
may be thought of in two ways: first as an abstract… system of
rules; second as the realized actions specified by these rules…. A
person taking part in a real institution knows what the rules demand
of him and others. He also knows that others know this and they
know that he knows this, and so on” (Rawls, 1971).
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Good institutions have been an essential component of economic
growth and development in the world. There are many examples
in literature dating back to the onset of industrial revolution in
Britain.  Reinert (2008:8) examined the link between good
institutions and development, using the events that triggered the
Industrial Revolution in England. He used the role of good
institutional reforms as a precursor to development in this regard.
Reinert (2008:8) praised the role of King Henry VII of England,
who came to power in 1485 and transformed a backward and
rural English society from a net producer of raw material to a
country well on its way to world economic domination and
prosperity. At that time, textile production was done in France,
but the raw material needed to produce the garments and textiles,
such as wool and aluminium silicate, were imported from England,
while Burgundy in France converted this wool into garments, the
latter being more prosperous than England (Reinert, 2008:8).  King
Henry VII undertook huge reforms in the regulations and tariffs
governing trade and manufacturing in England, which set the
country on the path to growth and development (Reinert, 2008:8).
It is not necessarily the natural resources with which a country is
endowed that determine its level of growth and development, but
rather the presence of good transparent and effective   institutions
in the country.
What development entails in Sub-Saharan Africa
In this article, it is important to provide a theoretical framework of
what development should entail for the average person living in
sub-Saharan Africa. To unpack the meaning of development, it is
crucial to understand the power of domination in the discourse of
development (Ukwandu, 2014). In this dispensation, the view of
the French theorist Michael Foucault aptly describes the concept
of development.  Foucault (1972,1980), postulated that the
“discursive formation theory” is used to illuminate the fact  that a
theory consists of a constellation  of assumptions, ideas, values,
definitions, themes, opinions, images, meanings, statements,
techniques and interpretations, which are used by people in order
to understand and discuss a particular subject or issue”. Foucault’s
(1972, 1980) narrative has helped development theorists and
intellectuals to see development as a discourse of domination (Said,
1978; Escobar, 1984; Esteva, 1987; Ferguson, 1990; Crush,
1995).
The “discourse theory” also shapes the way in which people relate
to and deal with these issues, and it governs their understanding
and interpretation (Foucault, 1980). The central tenet of discourse
theory is that discourses differ from society to society, nation to
nation, and religion to religion (Foucault, 1980).  This means that
discourses vary depending on race, class, gender and social norms,
and discourse theory therefore rejects the idea of universal truths
and a single course of action (Foucault, 1972). The theory holds
that beliefs, perspectives and understanding regarding issues will
differ from time to time.
Foucault’s (1980) discourse theory privileges community-level
understanding of and insights into any concept, theory or idea.
Using this example to clarify the discourse theory, as a group of
people living in sub-Saharan Africa, the author’s view of
development and what it entails could be vastly different from the
view of a person living in a developed country like Canada. This
difference in perspectives and privileges emphasises community,
national and regional insights and understanding of what
development entails. Consequent to this deduction, it then means
that the views of Africans must be taken into consideration in any
definition of development (Ukwandu, 2014).
The narrative of Foucault (1980) suggests that in seeking the
meaning of a concept such as development, its meaning must be
located within the cultural milieu of the African continent or a
country like South Africa. The understanding and appreciation of
development in sub-Saharan Africa then should not be based on
Western beliefs, values and ideology, since each society or country
has its own truths, which are unique to it (Ukwandu, 2014).  This
is how Foucault (1980) explained it:
“Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth:
that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes functions
as true, the mechanism and instances which enable one to
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the
acquisition of truth, the status of those who are charged with
saying what counts as true” (Foucault, 1980:131).
In a similar vein, Gramsci (1985) identified the differences between
civil and political society. He is of the view that the former is made
up of voluntary and rational affiliations in society, such as schools,
families, groups, churches, unions etc, while the latter includes
the army, police, intelligence and secret services of a country,
which rely on domination to control and safeguard society (Gramsci,
1985). Gramsci (1985) posited that culture, which determines the
trajectory of each society, is transferred through civil society. This
is so because this is where the influence of ideas and ideologies
pervades the whole society through consent or teaching in schools
and churches.
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It is the view of Gramsci (1985) that some cultural beliefs and
ideologies are more dominant than others, and this explains how
ideas came to be shared and accepted in Western societies, which
he refers to as ‘hegemony’. Extrapolating from the thesis of Gramsci
(1985) helps us to understand that because many international
organisations, such as the United Nations, World Bank, etc. have
defined development based on Western narratives, values and
ideology; the African perspective of development has mirrored
Western perspectives and worldviews. The Western perspective
has been shaped through what Gramsci (1985) called “Western
hegemony”. In view of these realities, it is imperative that, in this
article, the authors find a definition of development which is based
on the African context.
Demarcating a meaning and definition of development that gives
recognition and awareness to the living conditions of the average
African is crucial. This is so because, as Escobar (1995:213)
proposed in his interpretation of ‘discourse theory’ (Foucault,
1980:131), if the meaning of an idea is imposed on another society
as the only acceptable or best way of analysing and understanding
this concept, without taking into account the socio-cultural context
of that society, then it becomes ‘a colonising discourse’ that is
devoid of meaning or context (Escobar, 1995:213).
The focus here is on the fact that when we write about and discuss
development as it relates to sub-Saharan Africa, the aim is not to
conform to the narrow and technical definitions of Breton Woods
institutions (IMF and World Bank). This is because the technical
definitions of these world bodies are influenced and shaped by
their view of an increase in GDP as an indication of development.
Increase in the GDP of a country does not necessarily mean that
development is taking place.  We know for a fact that  economic
growth that does not create jobs and alleviate poverty makes little
or no difference in the lives of an ordinary African (Ukwandu,
2014). The goal is to focus on the human-based idea of
development, as highlighted by various scholars, an idea which is
based on the needs of the poor (Todaro, 1992; Sen, 1999; Marx,
cited in Cowen & Shenton 1996; Seers, 1983; Goulet, 1971;
Chambers, 1983).
It was Seers (1983) who summed up what development should
entail for the average person living in a poor and developing region
such as sub-Saharan Africa. He believed that whenever
development is mentioned, policy-makers and intellectuals should
interrogate whether or not it is fulfilling certain objectives (1983).
This is how he explained it:
“What has been happening to poverty, to unemployment and to
inequality? If all three of these have become less severe, then beyond
doubt this has been a period of development for all concerned. If
one or two of these central problems had been growing worse... it
would be strange to call the result development, even if per capita
income had soared” (Seers, 1983).
Staudt’s (1991) view of development had a powerful effect on
the reality of what development entails for the majority of people
living in sub-Saharan Africa. He explained that development is the
process of enlarging people’s choices, enhancing the ‘participatory
democratic process’ and the ‘ability of people to have a say in the
decisions that shape their lives’; of providing ‘human beings with
the opportunity to develop their fullest potential; of enabling the
poor, women and free independent peasants to organise for
themselves and work together’ (Staudt, 1991).
It is vital to emphasise the European and American dominance of
the meaning and concept of development. It has been widely
accepted, although erroneously, by developing countries of the
world, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, that development
encompasses capitalistic and Eurocentric ‘developmentalism’ and
what it embodies, as well as its values and aspirations (Escobar,
1995). Aseniero (1985) shared these sentiments by referring to
development as ‘a process that recreates the industrial world:
industrialised, urbanised, democratic and capitalist’.
In the Western literature, development has been depicted as a
‘crucible’ through which successful societies emerge purified,
modern and affluent (Goulet, 1971).It is in the context of these
prevailing narratives that ‘missionaries of development’ from
Washington, such as the IMF and World Bank, beguile sub-Saharan
African governments about the merits of mythical economic theories
that have woefully failed the continent. An example of some of
the prescribed reforms that failed is the structural adjustment
programmes or the downsizing of state machineries and withholding
of the various subsidies that cushion the poverty and suffering of
the masses (Sachs, 1992). Using development as a banner, the
majority of African governments were persuaded by international
organisations such as the World Bank and IMF to shoulder large
reductions in public expenditure in the early 1980s (Mkandawire
& Olukoshi 1995; Bangura, 1986). These reductions in size of the
public were done at a level that cannot be achieved even in the so-
called developed countries of the world, where the welfare system
helps to sustain the vulnerable members of the population
(Mkandawire & Olukoshi, 1995; Bangura, 1986; Mamdani, 1991;
Mustapha, 1988).
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Finally, when we use the concept of development in sub-Saharan
Africa, it must pave the way for a more comprehensive, inclusive
and broader definition of the concept that includes all segments of
the population. This definition of development provided by the
World Bank sums up the reality of what development should entail
for an average person in sub-Saharan Africa:
‘Development in a broader sense is understood to include other
important and related attributes as well, notably more equality of
opportunity and political freedom and civil liberties. The overall
goal of development is therefore to increase the economic, political
and civil rights of all people across gender, ethnic groups, religion,
races, regions and countries’ (World Bank ,1991a:31).
Sen (1999) provided the most poignant definition of development,
which captures the kind of development that is needed in Africa.
According to Sen:
“The expansion of freedom is viewed as both (a) the primary
end and (b) the principal means of development. They can
be called respectively ‘the consultative role’ and the
‘instrumental role’ of freedom in development”
(Sen,1999:36).
The second definition of development by Sen (1999) was also apt
to the socio-cultural milieu of sub-Saharan Africa. This is how he
captured it:
“Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom:
poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as
systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as
intolerance or over activity of repressive states” (Sen, 1999:37).
The relationship between good institutions, economic
growth and development
There is now a near unanimity among many experts in economic
growth and development that good institutions or what is referred
to by some as good governance is crucial to any development
policy and initiative (Kaufman et al., 2000; Knack, 2003; Hall &
Jones, 1999; Henisz, 2000; Bockestette et al., 2002; Rodrick et
al., 2004; Dreher & Herzfeld, 2005; Persoon & Tabellini, 2006). It
is the poor institutions in sub-Saharan Africa that militates against
economic growth and development in the region. Pempel indicated
that the role of good institutions in the socio-economic growth
and development of Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and
other countries of South East Asia cannot be overemphasised (cited
in Woo- Cummings, 1999:142).This salient role offers lessons and
insights to countries in sub-Saharan Africa on developing countries
in Africa.
Many scholars in the development field have pointed out that having
clear economic and political guidelines and policies remains the
best way to stimulate growth and development (Hall & Jones,
1999; Henisz, 2000; Dreher & Herzfeld, 2005; Persoon & Tabellini,
2006).  In their view, good governance entails having clear,
coherent, transparent and effective guidelines by which businesses
operate (Hall and Soskice 2001; Pontusson 2005; Svensson &
Oberg 2005). These aspects of good governance must be in the
form of an efficient judiciary and good institutions of government,
such as the bureaucracy responsible for the registration of
companies and securing of property rights of individuals, which
are the responsibilities of government, and it has to be guaranteed
that politically connected individuals will not sabotage the system
(North, 1990:25).  Understanding the crucial nexus between the
political and economic institutions in a country, which the authors
equate with good institutions, is essential to the smooth functioning
of capitalism, economic growth and development. This absence
of good and effective institutions is one of the reasons why
development has been elusive in Africa.
North (2005) noted that ‘good institutions beget good governance’.
It is the quality of the institutions or governance structure in a
country that determines its long-term economic growth or
stagnation. Sharma (2007) opined that when one writes about
institutions of governance, one needs to bear in mind that this
consists of all the formal rules and regulations that guide the country
(the constitutions, laws and regulations).Good institutions also
comprise of all the informal rules and regulations of governance
(such as traditional beliefs, social customs, norms, morals and
values) that regulate and influence human behaviour and, most
importantly, those that influence economic transactions between
people within the economy ( Sharma, 2007).
North (2005) enumerated  the distinctions between good and poor
institutions  when he posited that when the governance structure
of a society acts as an incentive (good institutions ) for individuals,
firms and organisations to be productive, then the economy grows,
leading to economic growth and development. However, when
the institutions of governance are predatory on individuals (which
is poor and ineffective institutions), the economy stagnates (North,
1995). Examples of these poor institutions abound in many
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where the police extort money
from private businesses, municipal councils come up with all sorts
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of levies and taxes, and national governments take forever to
register companies. In this scenario of poor and ineffective
institutions, economic growth stagnates and poverty and
underdevelopment become normalised (North & Weingast,
1989).Sharma (2007) emphasised the critical importance of good
governance in development when he distinguished between poor
institutions, which are riddled with uncertainty, and good
institutions, which are characterised by certainty and clarity. This
means that the informal methods of conducting interpersonal
exchanges or business, which are common among people in
traditional societies, are unsuitable for modern and complex
societies that desire economic growth (Sharma, 2007). The authors
can infer from these sentiments that given the complex division of
labour and  specialisation of skills needed for economic growth
and development in a globalised economy today, it becomes
essential that rules governing the activities and transactions of
individuals or firms be formally regulated, clarified and transparent
(Sharma, 2007).  This is what is called good institutions.
Knack & Keefer (1997) posited that the institutional environment
for economic activity generally determines the ability of developing
countries to catch up with the developed countries’ standard of
living. Mauro (1995) studied the strong empirical link between
corruption and growth and concluded that lack of effective checks
and balances in public finances hinders development efforts and
poverty reduction, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.  A good number
of scholars in the field of Development and Economics   place
good institutions over other factors such as geography and culture
as a key determinant of economic growth and development
outcomes in a country (Easterly & Levine, 2002; Rodrik,
Subramanian & Trebbi, 2002). Some other experts in the field of
development have found evidence of how geographical,
ethnographic and epidemiological factors stifle or accelerate
economic growth and development in countries, but these
researchers are still of the view that good and effective institutions
remains the most important factor in determining the development
trajectory of a country or region (Sachs & Warner, 1997; Diamond,
1999). It is the ‘Holy Grail’ in the quest for development (Sachs &
Warner 1997; Diamond, 1999).
According to North (1990:25), one of the crucial components of a
good institution is the transaction cost involved in setting up a
business or company in a country or region. North explains that
transaction costs involve the fees, levies payable by a company or
an entrepreneur in a particular country, documents to be filed, the
length of time it takes for public officials to approve or disapprove
a particular business proposal or project. It also includes protection
of property rights, rule of law, security etc. It is his argument that
this transaction cost which is an integral aspect of good institutions
plays a significant role in the overall economic growth and
development of a country or region.
Some scholars have examined the relationship between the
transaction costs in a country and its economic growth and
development, and they are of the view that transaction costs have
a significant effect on the productivity, economic growth and total
development of any country or region (Martinez & Dacin, 1999).
In a country or region with good institutions, transaction costs
should ideally set out the terms of operation, rules and regulations
and agreement between individuals and firms operating in that
particular country or region. These transparent rules and regulations
help entrepreneurs and companies to plan accordingly.
The cost of doing business in sub-Saharan Africa or what North
(1990:25) called the ‘transaction cost’ is very high compared to
other regions of the world. This high transaction cost which is a
product of poor institutions in the region has served as a disincentive
to business and economic growth and development. The terms of
doing business and the efficacy of the regulatory bodies that protect
the intellectual property of entrepreneurs serve as oil in the engine
of capitalism and growth, and this is what good institutions entails
(North, 1995:25). The uncertainty that stems from incomplete
information or lack of clarity on the regulations of countries is
actually poor institutions, and this is the main impediment to growth
and development in the region.The crucial role of transaction costs
(which is an important determinant of good institutions) in
stimulating economic growth and development globally is clearly
amplified by Milgrom and Roberts.  This is how they explained it:
“The cost of deciding, planning, arranging and negotiating the
actions to be taken and the terms of exchange when two or more
parties do business; the costs of changing plans, renegotiating terms
and resolving disputes as changing circumstances may require; and
the costs of ensuring that parties perform as agreed. Transaction
costs also include any losses resulting from inefficient group
decisions, plans, arrangements or agreements; inefficient responses
to changing circumstances; and imperfect enforcement of
agreements” (cited in Oskarsson et al., 2009).
These transaction costs are products of the kind of institutions of
governance existing in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Economic
growth and development in any country is a direct function of the
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type of institution (poor or good) which is dominant in that country
or region. Economic growth and development, as well as the
subsequent reduction of poverty, depends on the smooth
functioning of and trust in the regulations governing business
activities in a country or region  (Ukwandu, 2014). These rules
must be clear and transparent, and anyone flouting the laws or
regulations should be disciplined without fear or favour. Laws must
be formulated in such a way as to conform to what Adam Smith
called the ‘favouring of commerce’. According to him:
“Commerce and manufacturing can seldom flourish in any state
which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice in which
the people do not feel themselves secure in their possession of
their property, in which the faith of contracts are not supported by
law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be
regularly enforced in the payment of debts from all those who are
able to pay. Commerce and manufacturing can flourish in any state
in which there is a certain degree of confidence in the justice of
government” (cited in Rodrick et al., 2004).
An example of how the transaction costs of doing business in
sub-Saharan Africa blights economic growth and development can
be understood in terms of how poor and ineffective institutions
have stifled economic growth in the region. These examples
illustrate evidence of poor institutions in the region: it takes 153
days to register a company in Mozambique and 14 steps to
complete the registration. It takes three months and 16 processes
to register a company in Democratic Republic of Congo. In Nigeria,
there are 15 different types of taxes paid to the local governments,
state and federal governments to register and start a company.
Starting a brand new business in Nigeria is bedevilled with the
twin problem of lack of adequate infrastructure and electricity,
and insecurity. This is notwithstanding the fact that the business
owner has to provide his own security, water and electricity. It
takes almost a year for an office telephone line to be installed for
a new entrepreneur or company to start a business in Ghana,
Nigeria, Cameroon, DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia etc. Different layers
of different taxes by the governments discourage people from
starting small-scale businesses in Cameroon. In Malawi, it is far
better to operate without the registration of companies, as the
government charges prohibitive fees and taxes for all business
owners(internet source: BBC News).
Let us narrow it down to the events in Mozambique. This is because
the country is usually touted as a template for good institutions
and strong regulatory framework in the region. Mozambique is
globally seen as the beacon of hope and reform, while the reality
is that it takes six months to register a company. Within those six
months, various government departments will demand all sorts of
permits and licences and mandatory fees totalling almost 10% of
the budgeted cost of the company (Emery & Spence, 1999:9).
This incongruity is replicated in many sub-Saharan African countries,
and it is unthinkable how small-scale business owners are able to
obtain permits, start their businesses and still make profits and
pay taxes.
Kaufman & Kraay (2003) concluded through their studies that good
institutions and governance is the most important aspect of
development. According to them, it also determines whether or
not governments are able to use the resources in their countries
for the upkeep of the majority (Kaufman & Kraay, 2003). This
sentiment is shared by many experts in the development field (North
& Thomas, 1973; Olson, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2003; Rodrik,
Subramanian & Trebbi, 2002; Hall & Jones, 1999; Dollar & Kraay,
2003). These views of Kaufman and Kraay (2003) were affirmed
by others, who held that critical aspects of governance in a country,
such as its institutions, bureaucracy and economic policies, actually
account for the variations in economic growth and development
that we witness across regions and continents today (Roll & Talbot,
2003). These variations in economic growth and development have
little to do with geography, culture, colonialism or globalisation,
as is commonly believed by many in Africa. This means that
countries that have  clear, concise and transparent property rights,
transparent business practices, political rights, civil liberties, and
a stable rule of law, which all embody good institutions, usually
have a greater possibility of experiencing economic growth and
development (Roll & Talbot, 2003).
Landes (1999:217) listed the essential ingredients for the growth
of Britain and indeed much of the developed world. At the top of
the list is the idea that good institutions are inviolate to
development. Development must involve a state that is premised
on growth. The essential ingredients for development, according
to Landes (1999:217), are as follows:
 Secure rights of private property, the better to encourage
savings and investment.
 Secure rights of personal liberty against both the abuses of
tyranny and private disorder (crime and corruption).
 Enforce rights of contract, both explicit and implicit.
 Provide stable government, not necessarily democratic, but
itself governed by publicly known rules (a government of
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laws rather than men). If democratic, the government should
be based on periodic elections, where the majority wins but
does not violate the rights of the losers, while the losers
accept their loss and look forward to another turn at the
polls.
 Provide responsive government, one that will hear complaints
and come up with solutions.
 Provide honest government, such that economic actors are
not moved to seek advantage and privilege inside and outside
the market place. No preference must be shown with regard
to favour and position.
 Provide moderate, efficient, and non-rapacious government.
The effect should be to keep taxes down, reduce the
government’s claim on the social surplus, and avoid privilege
(Landes, 1999:217).
The role of good institutions in development can be gleaned through
the work of Amsden (1989) who, in her very perceptive study
underscored the way in which the South Korean state was able to
facilitate an amazing technological and industrial revolution in a
formerly rural and agricultural country that had endured years of
Japanese colonialism. It is a fact that South Korea was poorer
than Tanzania in 1950 and had the same GDP as Ghana and Nigeria
in 1960 (Amsden, 1989).This change was possible though good
institutions. The ruling elite in South Korea was able to reduce the
transaction costs  of doing business in their countries and improve
the efficiency of public institutions to engender good governance,
which ultimately paved the way for the development of the country.
Africa can replicate this outcome if it enshrines good and effective
institutions in its body polity.
Wade (1990) also concentrated in his study on the role of good
institutions. The author used Taiwan as an example of a capable
and effective state that managed to transform a rural and agrarian
society into one of the economic success stories of the 20th century
(Wade, 1990). Ha-Joon Chang (1994) believed that a state that is
imbued with good institutions and good governance is best
equipped to direct and transform the economic trajectories of its
country. He further stated that it must be a state which can create
and regulate the economic and political relationships to support
sustained industrialisation (Ha-Joon Chang, 1994).  According to
him, the state should have a strategic goal of long-term growth
and take structural change seriously (Ha-Joon Chang, 1994).  The
state should also politically manage the economy to ease the
conflicts that are inevitable during the process of such change,
and engage in institutional adaptation and innovation to achieve
these goals (Ha-Joon Chang, 1994).
Mauro (2004) noted that a consensus seems to have been reached
within the development community that corruption and other
aspects of poor institutions have substantial and adverse effects
on economic growth and development. Hall & Jones (1999) further
affirmed that the primary determinant of a country’s long-run
economic performance is its ‘social infrastructure’. This ‘social
infrastructure’ refers to the institutions and government policies
that provide the incentives for individuals and firms within an
economy (Hall & Jones, 1999). Weber (1981:312-14) underscored
the reason for the rise of Western and European economies from
the ashes of poverty and penury, namely the presence of rationality
in their public affairs. By this, Weber was referring to an effective
bureaucracy that understands the essence of governance and
administration (Weber, 1981:312). He emphasised that economic
growth and development, and subsequently humane capitalism,
can only develop and flourish when the essence of governance in
states is rational and efficient. In other words, the state must
have good institutions (Weber, 1981:312).According to him:
“The West developed because of its rational organisation of labour.
The entry of the commercial principle into the internal domestic
economy, with the concomitant lifting of national and ethical barriers
to commerce; and the disintegration of primitive economic fixity in
the wake of the entrepreneur organisation of labour. Only the West
knows the state in the modern sense, with professional
administration, specialised officialdom, and law-based on the
concept of citizenship... Only the West knows rational law.
Furthermore Western civilisation is further distinguished from every
other by the presence of men with a rational ethic for the conduct
of life” (Weber, 1981:312-14).
Kohli (2006) explored the various development outcomes of several
countries such as South Korea, Brazil, India and Nigeria, and
concluded that good institutions and governance is the minimum
requirement for establishing growth and development. Evans
(1995), in his study on the economic transformation and
development of East Asian economies (Singapore, South Korea
and Taiwan), gave further support to the views of Kohli (2006),
and was able to underscore the significant strides that can be
made in development outcomes in countries that are not even
democratic, as long as coherent government policies  are effectively
implemented.
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Acemoglu and Robinson determined (2002) the reasons for the
differences in economic growth and development between some
parts of the world, such as Mexico and Indonesia, which were
more prosperous, populated and developed than the countries of
North America, Australia and New Zealand in 1500 before the
advent of European colonialism in those areas. The study found
that the most touching clarification for the rise and decline of
nations, which is relevant to many developing countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, is what is called ‘institutional hypothesis’
(Acemoglu  & Robinson, 2002:2). In this regard, they held that
societies which endeavour to provide incentives and opportunities
for investment and efficiency in the administration of their affairs
will, in the long run, be richer than those who do not (North &
Thomas, 1973: North & Weingast, 1989; Olson, 2000). Embedded
in this view is the role of good and effective institutions in
stimulating economic growth and development.
Conclusion and recommendations
As seen earlier in the paper,there is abundant evidence in the
literature concerning the development of formerly poor countries
in Asia and South America that once the minimum requirement of
good institutions of governance is met in any country, whether in
the global South or North, development would be rooted and
poverty could be alleviated.  It is very easy in Africa to blame the
legacies of colonialism, globalisation and uneven terms of trade
within the global economy as the reasons for the poverty and
underdevelopment of the region. Very few policy-makers and
politicians are willing to assess the poor institutional framework
that underpins businesses and economic activities on the continent.
Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by poor institutions and poor
governance.  This serves as a handbrake to economic growth and
development. A survey of events in South America where many
countries that also went through the brutal legacy of colonialism
and imperialism were able to navigate their economies out of
poverty and underdevelopment; would provide useful lessons to
the policy-makers  and politicians in the region.
Further evidence to underscore the role of good institutions in
development can be found in the remarkable transformation and
development of South America. In the course of all the changes
that took place in this country, poverty fell dramatically: from 55%
to 18% in Costa Rica; 65% to 34% in El Salvador; and 57% to
44% in Columbia (Mills, 2010). Despite the legacy of brutal Spanish
colonial rule in these countries, they have been able to implement
good governance in many sectors of their public service, and as a
result, the reduction of poverty and underdevelopment. If these
countries could overcome poverty through institutional reforms,
the onus is on countries in sub-Saharan Africa to do the same
through the establishment of much leaner, more responsible and
effective government.
According to Mills (2010), Alvaro Uribe’s transformation of
Columbia is remarkable and almost revolutionary. He emphasised
good institutions and good governance since assuming the
presidency of his country in 2002 (Mills, 2010). He helped  reduce
poverty in the country by 20% and unemployment by 25% and
the number of citizens receiving public health care rose from less
than 400,000 in 2002 to just below 8 million in 2007 ( Mills
2010). In addition, primary school enrolment increased from 7.8
million to 9.3 million in the same period (Mills, 2010).
Brazil offers an example to countries in Africa which desire to
change the development prospects of their people, as Brazil endured
a brutal period of colonialism, had to navigate the treacherous
waters of globalisation, and was characterised as a multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural and multi-racial society. These are legacies which
we in the sub-region of Africa most times blame for our poverty
and underdevelopment, while the real reason is poor institutions.
Brazil is South America’s most populous country and has its biggest
economy, but has made significant strides in development as a
result of good institutions (Ukwandu, 2014).
To further underscore the role of good governance in development,
the former president of Brazil, Lula da Silva, on a recent visit to
South Africa, had this to say about the phenomenal growth and
development of his country:
‘The biggest legacy of my presidency is not the programmes that
took 30 million Brazilians out of absolute poverty and created 15
million jobs. It is the accountability of the public institutions and
the real partnership with business, labour and civil society that
brought hope to the people. We put the needs of the people first,
not ours’ (Naidoo, 2012:15).
When one remembers that one of the objectives of good governance
is accountability, it becomes clear that the main stumbling block
to Africa’s poverty and underdevelopment is poor governance and
the endemic corruption that characterises public institutions on
the continent. It is not geography, culture or malaria that is to
blame. The usual scapegoats of many political leaders in Africa,
namely colonialism and globalisation, were surmounted by the
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Brazilian presidency of da Silva, which put the needs of the poor
first. This is the route to development.
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